Production Policies in a Norwegian Utility Company: Multiple Stakeholders and Trade-offs Between Technical and Economic Optimisation

Details

Serval ID
serval:BIB_58553F84B337
Type
Inproceedings: an article in a conference proceedings.
Publication sub-type
Poster: Summary – with images – on one page of the results of a researche project. The summaries of the poster must be entered in "Abstract" and not "Poster".
Collection
Publications
Title
Production Policies in a Norwegian Utility Company: Multiple Stakeholders and Trade-offs Between Technical and Economic Optimisation
Title of the conference
Proceedings of the 16th International System Dynamics Conference
Author(s)
van Ackere A., Ruud M., Davidsen P.I.
Publisher
The System Dynamics Society
Address
Québec City, Canada
Publication state
Published
Issued date
1998
Pages
87
Language
english
Abstract
XXX is a utility company producing hydro-electric power. It is jointly owned by the companies YYY, ZZZ
and VVV. The owners use their share of the power produced, or sell it on the open market. They have a variety of other
sources from which they can acquire electricity. A government agency has the right to utilise a fraction of the capacity
of one of XXX’s power stations whenever called for. This paper addresses the issue of planning electricity production
so as to optimise the use of water. There are two aspects to this issue: (i) managing the water inventory most effectively
and (ii) timing production to take advantage of large price fluctuations and the requirements of the owners. To illustrate
the complexity involved: The owners have rights to a certain volume of water, not to a share of the electricity produced.
The value of a m3 of water depends, however, on the current amount of water in all the reservoir, as well as the current speed of the turbines, since these factors affect the quantity of electricity produced from one m3.
This paper outlines a system dynamics model designed to address issues like:
- The trade-off between a technically and an economically optimal operation of the utility company.
- Negotiations between multiple shareholders with diverse objectives.
- Positive and negative externalities, , as well as a free rider issue.
- Investments and maintenance in the face of continued private ownership vs. ownership reverted to the government in the year 2006.
Create date
25/07/2017 13:11
Last modification date
20/08/2019 14:12
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