Are Public Private Partnerships that Rigid? And Why? Evidence from Price Provisions in French Toll Road Concession Contracts

Details

Serval ID
serval:BIB_584E23F54575
Type
Article: article from journal or magazin.
Collection
Publications
Institution
Title
Are Public Private Partnerships that Rigid? And Why? Evidence from Price Provisions in French Toll Road Concession Contracts
Journal
Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice
Author(s)
Athias Laure, Saussier Stéphane
ISSN
0965-8564
Publication state
Published
Issued date
05/2018
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Volume
111
Pages
174-186
Language
english
Abstract
Transport concession contracts are commonly said to be standardized and too rigid. They would not allow public authorities to adapt them to evolving context and circumstances. This paper aims at challenging this view and, more particularly, the view that contractual rigidity for transport concessions is exogenous. Using a transaction cost framework, we disentangle between three main determinants of contractual rigidity: traffic uncertainty; connivance between contracting parties; quality of the institutional environment. Using an original and unique database of mostly French toll road concession contracts, we observe a great variety of provisions for toll adjustment. While our results point out a positive impact of future traffic uncertainty on the propensity to resort to flexible contracts, they also highlight that higher trust between the contracting parties and more reliable institutional environments foster contractual flexibility. These results and the associated policy implications can be helpful in implementing the conditions under which the public and private partners are able to cope with the intrinsic incompleteness of these contracts.
Keywords
Transport concession contracts, Contractual design, Public private partnerships, Price provisions, Toll adjustments, Incomplete contracts
Create date
06/03/2018 8:53
Last modification date
21/08/2019 5:16
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