Optional interactions and suspicious behaviour facilitates trustful cooperation in prisoners dilemma.
Details
Serval ID
serval:BIB_546CDBAD77CB
Type
Article: article from journal or magazin.
Collection
Publications
Institution
Title
Optional interactions and suspicious behaviour facilitates trustful cooperation in prisoners dilemma.
Journal
Journal of theoretical biology
ISSN
1095-8541 (Electronic)
ISSN-L
0022-5193
Publication state
Published
Issued date
21/11/2017
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Volume
433
Pages
64-72
Language
english
Notes
Publication types: Journal Article
Publication Status: ppublish
Publication Status: ppublish
Abstract
In evolutionary game theory interactions between individuals are often assumed obligatory. However, in many real-life situations, individuals can decide to opt out of an interaction depending on the information they have about the opponent. We consider a simple evolutionary game theoretic model to study such a scenario, where at each encounter between two individuals the type of the opponent (cooperator/defector) is known with some probability, and where each individual either accepts or opts out of the interaction. If the type of the opponent is unknown, a trustful individual accepts the interaction, whereas a suspicious individual opts out of the interaction. If either of the two individuals opt out both individuals remain without an interaction. We show that in the prisoners dilemma optional interactions along with suspicious behaviour facilitates the emergence of trustful cooperation.
Keywords
Biological Evolution, Cooperative Behavior, Game Theory, Humans, Interpersonal Relations, Prisoner Dilemma, Trust, Evolution of cooperation, Evolutionary game theory, Non-social behaviour, Optional interactions, Partial information
Pubmed
Web of science
Create date
23/10/2017 9:10
Last modification date
20/08/2019 14:09