What About a Reductionist Approach? Comments on Terry Horgan

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Serval ID
serval:BIB_340AEACB311F
Type
Article: article from journal or magazin.
Collection
Publications
Institution
Title
What About a Reductionist Approach? Comments on Terry Horgan
Journal
Erkenntnis
Author(s)
Sachse Christian
ISSN
0165-0106
1572-8420
Publication state
Published
Issued date
2007
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Volume
67
Number
2
Pages
201-205
Language
english
Abstract
In his work, Horgan argues for the compatibilism of agency, mental state-causation, and physical causal-closure. We generally assume a causally closed physical world that seems to exclude agency in the sense of mental state-causation in addition to physical causation. However, Horgan argues for an account of agency that satisfies the experience of our own as acting persons and that is compatible with physical causal-closure. Mental properties are causal properties but not identical with physical properties because there are different ontological levels. In this commentary, I shall reconsider the essential issues of this compatibilism (1), focus on a problem for Horgan’s conception of agent causation that arises from the causal argument for ontological reductionism (2), and propose to embed Horgan’s conception of agency within a reductionist approach in order to vindicate the indispensable character of agency (3).
Keywords
Mental Property, Special Science, Multiple Realization, Scientific Quality, Agentive Experience
Web of science
Open Access
Yes
Create date
16/07/2018 15:58
Last modification date
01/10/2019 7:17
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