Verified trust: Reciprocity, altruism, and noise in trust games

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Serval ID
serval:BIB_31723
Type
Report: a report published by a school or other institution, usually numbered within a series.
Publication sub-type
Working paper: Working papers contain results presented by the author. Working papers aim to stimulate discussions between scientists with interested parties, they can also be the basis to publish articles in specialized journals
Collection
Publications
Institution
UNIL/CHUV
Title
Verified trust: Reciprocity, altruism, and noise in trust games
Author(s)
Brülhart M., Usunier J.-C.
Institution details
CEPR - Centre for Economic Policy Research
Issued date
11/2004
Number
4758
Genre
Discussion Paper
OAI-PMH
oai:serval.unil.ch:BIB_31723
Publisher's website
http://www.cepr.org/pubs/new-dps/dplist.asp?dpno=4758
Create date
19/11/2007 11:01
Last modification date
20/08/2019 14:16
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