Mental Causation and the Metaphysics of Causation

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Serval ID
serval:BIB_3083E65B7943
Type
Article: article from journal or magazin.
Collection
Publications
Institution
Title
Mental Causation and the Metaphysics of Causation
Journal
Erkenntnis
Author(s)
Esfeld Michael
ISSN
0165-0106
1572-8420
Publication state
Published
Issued date
2007
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Volume
67
Number
2
Pages
207-220
Language
english
Abstract
The paper argues for four claims: (1) The problem of mental causation and the argument for its solution in terms of the identity of mental with physical causes are independent of the theory of causation one favours. (2) If one considers our experience of agency as described by folk psychology to be veridical, one is committed to an anti-Humean metaphysics of causation in terms of powers that establish necessary connections. The same goes for functional properties in general. (3) A metaphysics of causation in terms of powers is compatible with physics. (4) If combined with the argument for mental causes being identical with physical causes, that metaphysics leads to a conservative reductionism.
Keywords
Causal Relation, Causal Power, Categorical Property, Transference Theory, Mental Causation
Web of science
Open Access
Yes
Create date
16/07/2018 14:59
Last modification date
01/10/2019 6:17
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