Hedonic coalition formation games with variable populations: core characterizations and (im)possibilities

Details

Serval ID
serval:BIB_23796E32A054
Type
Article: article from journal or magazin.
Collection
Publications
Institution
Title
Hedonic coalition formation games with variable populations: core characterizations and (im)possibilities
Journal
International Journal of Game Theory
Author(s)
Karakaya M., Klaus B.
ISSN
0020-7276
Publication state
Published
Issued date
05/2017
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Volume
46
Number
2
Pages
435-455
Language
english
Abstract
We consider hedonic coalition formation games with variable sets of agents and extend the properties competition sensitivity and resource sensitivity (introduced by Klaus, Games Econ Behav 72:172-186, 2011, for roommate markets) to hedonic coalition formation games. Then, we show that on the domain of solvable hedonic coalition formation games, the Core is characterized by coalitional unanimity and Maskin monotonicity (see also Takamiya, Maskin monotonic coalition formation rules respecting group rights. Niigata University, Mimeo, 2010, Theorem 1). Next, we characterize the Core for solvable hedonic coalition formation games by unanimity, Maskin monotonicity, and either competition sensitivity or resource sensitivity (Corollary 2). Finally, and in contrast to roommate markets, we show that on the domain of solvable hedonic coalition formation games, there exists a solution not equal to the Core that satisfies coalitional unanimity, consistency, competition sensitivity, and resource sensitivity (Example 2).
Keywords
Coalitional unanimity, Competition sensitivity, Consistency, Core, Hedonic coalition formation, Maskin monotonicity, Resource sensitivity
Web of science
Create date
01/05/2016 17:50
Last modification date
20/08/2019 13:01
Usage data