The Political Communication of Independent Regulatory Agencies

Details

Serval ID
serval:BIB_1C64C290F3EA
Type
Article: article from journal or magazin.
Collection
Publications
Institution
Title
The Political Communication of Independent Regulatory Agencies
Journal
Revue suisse de science politique
Author(s)
Biela J., Maggetti M., Puppis M., Gilardi F., Papadopoulos Y.
Publication state
Published
Issued date
09/2014
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Volume
20
Number
3
Pages
388-412
Language
english
Abstract
Since independent regulatory agencies (IRAs) became key actors in European regulatory governance in the 1990s, a significant share of policy-making has been carried out by organizations that are neither democratically elected nor directly accountable to elected politicians. In this context, public communication plays an important role. On the one hand, regulatory agencies might try to use communication to raise their accountability and thereby to mitigate their democratic deficit. On the other hand, communication may be used with the intent to steer the behavior of the regulated industry when more coercive regulatory means are unfeasible or undesirable. However, empirical research focusing directly on how regulators communicate is virtually non-existent. To fill this gap, this paper examines the public communication of IRAs in four countries (the United Kingdom, Germany, Ireland, and Switzerland) and three sectors (financial services, telecommunications, and broadcasting). The empirical analysis, based on qualitative interviews and a quantitative content analysis, indicates that the organization of the communication function follows a national pattern approach while a policy sector approach is helpful for understanding the use of communication as a soft tool of regulation.
Keywords
Accountability, Legitimacy, Media, Regulation
Open Access
Yes
Create date
02/03/2015 11:54
Last modification date
20/08/2019 13:52
Usage data