Networks in Conflict: Theory and Evidence from the Great War of Africa

Details

Serval ID
serval:BIB_1490C37D88B0
Type
Article: article from journal or magazin.
Collection
Publications
Institution
Title
Networks in Conflict: Theory and Evidence from the Great War of Africa
Journal
Econometrica
Author(s)
Koenig M., Rohner D., Thoenig M., Zilibotti F.
ISSN
0012-9682
Publication state
Published
Issued date
07/2017
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Volume
85
Number
4
Pages
1093–1132
Language
english
Abstract
We study from both a theoretical and an empirical perspective how a network of military alliances and enmities affects the intensity of a conflict. The model combines elements from network theory and from the politico-economic theory of conflict. We obtain a closed-form characterization of the Nash equilibrium. Using the equilibrium conditions, we perform an empirical analysis using data on the Second Congo War, a conflict that involves many groups in a complex network of informal alliances and rivalries. The estimates of the fighting externalities are then used to infer the extent to which the conflict intensity can be reduced through (i) dismantling specific fighting groups involved in the conflict; (ii) weapon embargoes; (iii) interventions aimed at pacifying animosity among groups. Finally, with the aid of a random utility model we study how policy shocks can induce the reshaping of the network structure.
Open Access
Yes
Create date
05/01/2017 3:37
Last modification date
21/08/2019 5:15
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