College admissions with entrance exams: Centralized versus decentralized

Details

Serval ID
serval:BIB_070CB03D529F
Type
Article: article from journal or magazin.
Collection
Publications
Title
College admissions with entrance exams: Centralized versus decentralized
Journal
Journal of Economic Theory
Author(s)
Hafalir I.E., Hakimov R., Kübler D., Kurino M.
ISSN
0022-0531
Publication state
Published
Issued date
07/2018
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Volume
176
Pages
886-934
Language
english
Abstract
We study a college admissions problem in which colleges accept students by ranking students' efforts in entrance exams. Students' ability levels affect the cost of their efforts. We solve and compare equilibria of “centralized college admissions” (CCA) where students apply to all colleges and “decentralized college admissions” (DCA) where students only apply to one college. We show that lower ability students prefer DCA whereas higher ability students prefer CCA. Many predictions of the theory are supported by a lab experiment designed to test the theory, yet we find a number of differences that render DCA less attractive than CCA compared to the equilibrium benchmark.
Keywords
College admissions, Incomplete information, Student welfare, Contests, All-pay auctions, Experiment
Web of science
Create date
01/11/2018 12:12
Last modification date
20/08/2019 13:29
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